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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
USA Machinery Corporation ("USA") appeals the District 
Court's order granting judgment as a matter of law in favor 
of CSC, Ltd. ("CSC") and Algoma Steel, Inc. ("Algoma"). 
USA's seven-count complaint raised claims of breach of 
contract, tortious interference with contract, unjust 
enrichment, promissory estoppel, and fraud. On appeal, 
USA presses only the claims asserted in the first, second, 
and fifth counts of its complaint: those alleging breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment on the part of both 
defendants. 
 
This case arises from the efforts of USA, and in particular 
its president, Robert Hughes, to act as a broker for the sale 
of an assemblage of steel-making equipment, a "continuous 
caster,"1 from Algoma to CSC. When Algoma sold the 
equipment to CSC directly, USA sued the two companies in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Hughes described a caster as follows: 
 
       [I]t includes a multitude of pieces of equipment and it includes 
nine 
       bridge cranes, nine ladles, transfer cars, ladle met[sic] station, 
and 
       the caster. All of that equipment is several hundred tons. It would 
       probably take up, my guess would be, two or three times this room 
       size of boxes of equipment, and that's not saying how big it would 
       be after it is assembled. 
 
App. at 81. 
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Pennsylvania. Trial commenced on April 13, 1998. At the 
close of plaintiff's case, the District Court, on defendants' 
motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, ruled 
from the bench that USA failed to present sufficient 
evidence to reach the jury on its claims of breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment, and entered judgment as 
a matter of law. For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
 
II. 
 
Counts one and two of the complaint, the breach of 
contract claims against Algoma and CSC, allege that USA 
had contracts with each defendant, which defendants 
breached by dealing directly with each other rather than 
through USA. Specifically, USA alleges in count one that 
"CSC and USA Machinery entered into a contract under 
which CSC was obligated to deal with Algoma exclusively 
through USA Machinery and was obligated to pay to USA a 
finder's fee upon closure of the CSC-Algoma transaction." 
App. at 15. Similarly, with respect to Algoma, count two 
states that "Algoma and USA Machinery entered into a 
contract under which Algoma was obligated to deal with 
CSC exclusively through USA Machinery and was obligated 
to pay USA Machinery a finder's fee upon closure of the 
CSC-Algoma transaction." App. at 16. 
 
USA's unjust enrichment claim is set forth in countfive 
of the complaint. This count states, in pertinent part: 
 
        USA Machinery supplied information and services to 
       Defendants, and therefore conferred a substantial 
       value and benefit upon Defendants. 
 
        At all times relevant hereto, Defendants were aware 
       and acknowledged that USA Machinery was supplying 
       information and services with the expectation of 
       receiving compensation therefor. 
 
        USA Machinery has not been paid for its services or 
       for the value and benefit it conferred upon Defendants. 
 
        It would be unjust and inequitable for Defendants to 
       retain the value and benefit conferred upon them by 
       USA Machinery without compensation therefor. 
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App. at 18 (allegation numbers omitted). 
 
We review the record in a light most favorable to USA. 
See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 
(3d Cir. 1993). At trial, USA rested its case on the 
testimony of one witness, Hughes, and a number of 
documents introduced through Hughes's testimony. 
 
Hughes testified that USA is principally in the business 
of "buying and selling and brokering used steel mill 
equipment." App. at 80. Some 80% of USA's business 
consists of brokering sales of steel mill equipment, and 20% 
consists of selling equipment that USA owns. As Hughes 
testified, "brokerage" deals were structured either as (1) 
direct purchases between the buyer and the seller, with all 
parties having agreed to a fee to be paid to USA, or (2) 
"spread" transactions whereby USA consummates two 
transactions simultaneously -- a purchase by USA of the 
equipment from the seller and a concomitant sale from USA 
to the buyer, with USA's profit consisting of the difference 
in price between the two transactions. 
 
Hughes testified as follows regarding the structure of 
transactions in his business: 
 
       It is customary in our business that no agreement is 
       made until the end. The written agreement is the 
       purchase order. I have been doing it for 30 years, it's 
       never been different. We never enter into binding legal 
       contracts other than the purchase order which says, I 
       agree to purchase the equipment, and we offer -- you 
       know, it depends on the structuring of the deal, but 
       that's the end of the deal. That's when the contract is 
       put down on paper as to exactly the scope of the 
       purchase. 
 
App. at 93. 
 
When he was then asked what was agreed upon at the 
outset of such deals, Hughes responded: 
 
        What we agree on at the outset of the deal is that 
       when we are brokering equipment, we get the buyer of 
       the equipment to agree that, look, we are here to 
       service you, we are here to find equipment for you, but 
       in return once I find equipment for you, you're going to 
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       deal with me and purchase it and you are not going to 
       go around me once I find it for you and try to buy it 
       direct. 
 
        From the seller, the seller agrees if I bring him a 
       customer, a customer he does not have, I'm giving him 
       the opportunity to have a sale, he agrees not to deal 
       directly with my customer and have any 
       communication with my customer so I can 
       consummate a deal. That's the agreement we usually 
       have at the end of the deal. 
 
App. at 94. 
 
With respect to the transaction at issue in this case, 
Hughes testified that on November 25, 1995, he attended a 
meeting at CSC with Dan Stefano, a representative of CSC, 
at which Stefano related CSC's intention to construct a new 
melt shop facility -- a facility for the melting and refining of 
scrap steel. At the end of the discussion, Stefano stated 
"that he would be interested in any piece of used equipment 
that would fit any of the equipment needs that they had for 
this new project." App. at 130. The following day, Stefano 
told Hughes that CSC was in need of ladles, and Hughes 
related that he found some ladles that might be of interest 
to CSC. On November 28, 1995, Hughes sent Stefano 
information on the ladles. App. at 279. There was no 
communication between CSC and USA for approximately 
five months following this meeting. App. at 133. 
 
In April 1996, Stefano contacted Hughes by telephone 
and introduced him to Tony Wilson, the director of CSC's 
plan for expanding its facility. App. at 134. During this 
conversation, Wilson indicated that CSC was interested in 
finding used equipment for its expansion project, 
specifically an electric arc furnace. Id. On April 30, 1996, 
Hughes forwarded a letter and accompanying information 
about a furnace of this kind to Wilson. Shortly thereafter, 
Hughes met with Wilson at CSC's office in Ohio, where the 
two discussed the arc furnace and the possibility of Hughes 
finding other equipment for CSC. When Hughes was asked 
by his counsel whether a caster was referred to in these 
discussions, Hughes replied that "I am sure it was 
discussed, but I don't recall right now." App. at 139. 
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On May 17, 1996, Wilson visited USA's office in 
Pennsylvania; at this meeting Wilson reviewed information 
that Hughes had on various pieces of equipment, including 
the arc furnace. App. at 141-42. CSC ultimately never 
purchased the arc furnace that Hughes had found. 
 
At this time, USA was also doing business with Algoma, 
from which it had bought used equipment in the past. On 
June 26, 1996, Hughes went to Algoma's facility in Sault 
Ste. Marie, Ontario to inspect and finalize its purchase of a 
"bridge crane trolley" that it later resold in what Hughes 
described as a "spread" transaction. App. at 145-46. In the 
course of his visit, Hughes met with Bill Tucker and Paul 
Logan of Algoma. Logan led Hughes on a tour of the facility 
during which the two discussed used equipment that 
Algoma might be willing to sell, and Logan mentioned that 
Algoma had a caster that was not being used. App. at 147- 
48. Hughes then met with Tucker again and asked Tucker 
about the caster. Tucker responded that it was not 
presently for sale, but when Hughes stated that he had "a 
customer who may be interested in this caster," Tucker 
stated that "we would be very interested in any customer 
that you would have for the caster." App. at 148. No sale 
price for the caster was discussed at this or any 
subsequent meeting with Algoma officials. App. at 149. 
 
According to Hughes's testimony on cross-examination, 
Hughes did not initiate any communication with CSC 
regarding the Algoma caster after he returned to 
Pennsylvania following his trip to Algoma's facility. App. at 
225-26. According to Hughes's direct testimony, he never 
discussed with CSC the possibility of an exclusive contract 
with USA for the purchase or sale of any caster. Nor did he 
discuss an exclusive arrangement with Algoma whereby 
USA had the exclusive right to sell Algoma's caster. App. at 
159-60. 
 
On July 8, 1996, Al Zalner of CSC called Hughes, 
explaining that he was now the official charged with the 
responsibility of overseeing CSC's expansion effort. Zalner, 
like Wilson, told Hughes that CSC was interested infinding 
any used equipment that would suit the company's needs. 
App. at 150. When Hughes asked Zalner if CSC would be 
interested in finding a used caster, Zalner replied that the 
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company had been searching for one but had given up. 
App. at 151. Hughes then informed Zalner that he had 
found one and Zalner asked Hughes to "get me as much 
information as you can." App. at 151. The conversation 
then turned to the nine ladles that had been previously 
discussed. When Zalner asked where the ladles were 
located, Hughes responded that he "could not divulge the 
location of the ladles until [he] registered CSC as his 
customer," when he would be "glad to give [Zalner] the 
information and location." App. at 153. Hughes testified 
that Zalner responded by saying "okay." App. at 153. 
Hughes also testified that he informed Zalner that the 
manufacturer of the caster was Voest Alpine. App. at 168. 
 
Hughes then called Tucker at Algoma informing him that 
USA had a customer that was interested in inspecting the 
ladles. Hughes further stated that he wanted to "register" 
the customer as USA's customer. Tucker reportedly stated 
"yes, we accept your registration." App. at 156. When 
Hughes was pressed by both counsel and the court on the 
issue of whether the caster was discussed in this 
conversation, Hughes responded in the affirmative, but 
gave no indication of the nature of that discussion. App. at 
154-55. After this conversation, Hughes wrote to Tucker 
stating: "As discussed we have a customer interested in 
purchasing your nine 95 ton ladles. Our customer asked us 
to divulge the location so that they can make arrangements 
for an inspection. We now wish to register our customer 
with you for protection. Our customer is CSC . . . . Should 
our customer contact you directly or indirectly please ask 
them to make all inquiries through USA Machinery 
Corporation." App. at 282. The letter made no mention of 
the caster. Hughes did not send a comparable letter to 
CSC. 
 
Hughes then had several conversations with Logan at 
Algoma in which Hughes requested information about the 
caster. On July 11, 1996, Hughes sent Zalner at CSC a 
letter containing information on the caster. The letter 
described the caster as including a "ladle turret" and 
possibly "some bridge cranes." There is no mention of ladles 
being part of the caster unit in the letter. The letter 
continued: "This equipment is not currently on the market 
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for sale. However, it is possible that an agreement to sell 
can be reached in the future. If you are interested, I 
suggest that we inspect the caster and at that time we can 
discuss some of the parameters of your interest and the 
owner's future plan." App. at 285. 
 
Hughes testified that "right around" July 11, he had a 
phone conversation with Zalner in which Hughes informed 
Zalner that the owner of the caster was Algoma. Zalner 
responded, "yes, I know that the caster is at Algoma." App. 
at 168. When Hughes then asked Zalner how he knew, 
Zalner replied that he had called Voest Alpine, the 
manufacturer, who informed Zalner of the owner. Hughes 
then said to Zalner, "you're just operating on my 
information," to which Zalner replied, "yes, you're right." 
App. at 168-69. On July 12, Hughes sent Zalner a letter 
describing the caster and several associated pieces of 
equipment. The letter also stated that "this equipment is 
made to be used with the 95 ton ladles we have been 
discussing." The letter closed stating, "I am looking forward 
to our site inspection at which time we can discuss the 
pertinent variables which effects [sic] a project of this size." 
App. at 286. 
 
From July 12 to July 18, Hughes had several 
conversations with Zalner in which Zalner repeatedly asked 
Hughes to get more information about the caster. During 
this period, Hughes attempted to arrange a site inspection 
for CSC at Algoma. After receiving a drawing of the caster 
from Algoma on July 19, Hughes delivered the drawing to 
Zalner. On July 22, Hughes called Zalner to ask whether he 
was ready to go to Algoma to inspect the equipment. Zalner 
responded by telling Hughes that he was going to Algoma 
on July 24, having already "made arrangements with 
Algoma." App. at 180-81. In a phone conversation later the 
same day between Hughes, Zalner, and Tom Fisher of CSC, 
Hughes complained that CSC was circumventing him. 
Hughes related the reaction of Zalner and Fisher thus: 
"Basically they said to me that although I had found the 
caster for them -- and they freely admitted that I was the 
one that found the caster -- that if I had a commission due, 
my problem was to go to Algoma and they had no contract 
with me . . . ." App. at 181-82. 
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Hughes then called Tucker at Algoma, complaining that 
Algoma was dealing directly with USA's customer despite 
the registration letter. According to Hughes, Tucker 
responded "that it was basically out of his hands." Hughes 
went on to relate that Tucker told him "[t]hat corporate had 
made a decision that because my registration letter was not 
signed by Algoma they felt justified in not honoring. And 
that although he felt that they were going to give me 
protection on the ladles that it was corporate's stance that 
because there was no signature, there was nothing I could 
do about it and it was my tough luck." App. at 183-84. The 
following month, on August 23, 1996, Algoma sold the 
caster and associated equipment, including the ladles, to 
CSC for $5 million. 
 
As previously noted, the District Court ruled that the 
evidence presented through Hughes's testimony was not 
sufficient to create a jury issue either on USA's contract 
claims or its claims of unjust enrichment, and, accordingly, 
granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of CSC and 
Algoma. Our standard of review is plenary; judgment as a 
matter of law is appropriate only "if, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the 
advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is 
insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could 
find liability." Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1166. 
 
III. 
 
At the outset, we must make two observations. First, 
although USA's complaint raised numerous causes of 
action, USA appears only to press its breach of contract 
and unjust enrichment claims although none of the other 
causes of action were dismissed prior to trial. During the 
colloquy after defendants moved for judgment as a matter 
of law, the court asked USA what theories of recovery it 
contemplated, and its counsel responded that there were 
"at least two" and then advanced the contract and unjust 
enrichment claims. After oral argument, the court granted 
judgment as a matter of law on all claims against CSC and 
Algoma; there was no further discussion of any of the other 
claims alleged in the complaint. App. at 269-276. On 
appeal, USA presses only its claims of contract and unjust 
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enrichment. Accordingly, it appears that all other claims 
were abandoned, and our discussion will be confined to the 
claims discussed by the parties. 
 
Second, despite the interstate, and indeed international, 
nature of the putative transactions at issue, the parties 
have not chosen to address choice-of-law issues. Algoma 
mentions, in a footnote, that "USA assumes that 
Pennsylvania substantive law applies in this diversity case, 
and Algoma agrees." Appellee Algoma's Brief at 16 n.7. 
Because the parties appear to be in agreement on this 
issue, we will assume, without deciding, that Pennsylvania 
law supplies the appropriate substantive rules. 
 
A. 
 
USA argues first that the District Court misapplied the 
law in ruling that there was no evidence to support a 
contract between USA and CSC or between USA and 
Algoma. The parties agree that "the test for enforceability of 
an agreement is whether both parties have manifested an 
intention to be bound by its terms and whether the terms 
are sufficiently definite to be specifically enforced." ATACS 
Corp. v. Trans World Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 
665 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Hence our task in reviewing the District Court's grant of 
judgment as a matter of law is to examine the record to 
determine whether the evidence would support a jury's 
finding that the parties to the two putative contracts 
expressed their mutual intent to be bound to terms that are 
sufficiently definite to be enforced. 
 
However, USA offered no evidence that is consistent with 
the type of contract alleged in the complaint, i.e., that both 
CSC and Algoma agreed to pay USA a "finder's fee" upon 
the completion of any transaction. USA has not pointed to, 
and we have not found in the record, any testimony or 
documents suggesting such an agreement. In fact, 
notwithstanding the complaint, USA's brief states that it 
"did not contend or attempt to prove at trial that the parties 
had a fully-formed and detailed agreement with regard to 
the final purchase and sale of the caster and thefinal 
payment for USA's services." Appellant's Brief at 17. Indeed, 
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Hughes testified that he never had any conversations with 
Zalner at CSC about a fee for his services, whether 
connected to the ladles or the caster, App. at 209; that he 
could not specify whether he expected that he would be 
paid in the form of a lump sum, a percentage, or a "spread" 
because "[CSC and Algoma] cut us out of the deal before we 
got to specifics," App. at 194; and that there was ordinarily 
no contract until the final consummation of a sale, App. at 
93. 
 
We have previously stated in the brokerage context that 
"a broker cannot recover a commission, even though he 
brought the seller and buyer together, unless he can prove 
a contract of employment, express or implied, oral or 
written, between himself and the buyer (or seller) or an 
acceptance and ratification of his acts by the buyer (or 
seller)." Christo v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 609 F.2d 1058, 1061 
(3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Consequently, there is insufficient evidence in the record, 
when viewed most favorably toward USA, upon which a 
jury could reasonably base a conclusion that USA had an 
agreement with either or both of the defendants under 
which any sale of equipment from Algoma to CSC would 
yield a fee for USA. 
 
On appeal, USA advances a different theory for its 
contract claim: not that there were contracts by which the 
defendants agreed to pay it a finder's fee but that the 
agreements between the parties were "in the nature of 
agreements to negotiate in good faith." Appellant's Brief at 
16. Further, USA argues, these agreements involved 
promises on the part of CSC and Algoma "to deal with one 
another exclusively through USA and to pay USA a 
reasonable fee if a transaction was later finalized." 
Appellant's Brief at 18. 
 
We are unpersuaded. To be sure, we have held, under 
Pennsylvania law, that an agreement to negotiate in good 
faith can be enforceable under certain circumstances. See 
Channel Home Centers, Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v. 
Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1986). However, 
our holding in that case was predicated on several 
circumstances that are not present here. In Channel Home 
Centers, the putative agreement between a commercial 
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property owner and a prospective lessee whereby the owner 
agreed to withdraw a property from the market during 
negotiations for a lease was embodied in a "detailed" letter 
of intent signed by both parties. Id. at 292. We found an 
"unequivocal promise" in the language of the letter, which 
stated: "[t]o induce the Tenant [Channel] to proceed with 
the leasing of the Store, you [Grossman] will withdraw the 
Store form the rental market, and only negotiate the above 
described leasing transaction to completion." Id. at 299. 
Our conclusion that the parties intended to be bound by 
the letter was supported by the preparation of a draft lease, 
architectural planning, zoning applications, and 
correspondence and telephone conversations. Id.  
 
This case, by contrast, does not present similar indicia of 
intent to be bound, as there is no "detailed" expression of 
the parties' intent. In the case of CSC, the record shows 
that Hughes informed Zalner that USA wished to "register" 
CSC as its customer during a discussion about the nine 
ladles that Algoma owned, and that Zalner said "okay." 
App. at 153. There was no discussion of what "registration" 
entailed, and Hughes acknowledged that he never used the 
term "exclusive" in his negotiations with CSC. App. at 209. 
He also acknowledged that USA had never previously 
consummated a transaction with CSC. Unlike the situation 
in Channel Home Centers, there were also no extensive 
preparations. Hughes merely supplied CSC with some 
information about the caster at CSC's request and 
discussed with Zalner the possibility of a site inspection. 
These circumstances do not suggest that the parties had 
reached the point at which they expressed mutual intent to 
be bound. 
 
With respect to Algoma, USA offered evidence from which 
a jury could conclude that in a telephone conversation 
between Tucker and Hughes Algoma agreed to accept USA's 
"registration" of CSC as its customer with respect to the 
nine ladles, an agreement memorialized in a letter from 
Hughes to Tucker. But there is nothing in the record to 
suggest that the parties' minds had met on exactly what 
such registration entailed. Although USA had 
consummated transactions with Algoma in the past, and 
had sent Algoma similar registration letters in connection 
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with those transactions, there is nothing in the record from 
which a jury could reasonably infer that the parties to the 
prior transactions attached the meaning to those letters 
that USA urges. These prior letters to Algoma provide an 
insufficient explanation of the meaning of registration for a 
jury to infer an agreement to negotiate in good faith of the 
kind that we found cognizable in Channel Home Centers. 
 
There is insufficient evidence from which a jury could 
draw a reasonable inference that Algoma, as a result of 
these prior dealings, understood that registration meant 
that Algoma agreed to deal exclusively with USA to 
consummate the transaction at issue. 
 
Nor has USA offered evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that there was an industry custom that would 
support the contract claim. When asked on direct 
examination at what point on "a continuum from 
expressing an initial interest to find a piece of equipment, 
sending information, a site visit, then negotiations," a 
written agreement was entered into, Hughes testified that it 
was "customary . . . that no agreement is made until the 
end." App. at 93. He explained that at the outset he would 
enter into an agreement under which USA would render 
services in exchange for promises from the buyer and seller 
that they would not circumvent USA and deal directly with 
each other. App. at 94. This testimony is insufficient to 
support a finding that it was understood throughout the 
industry that the term "registration" involved an agreement 
of the kind Hughes outlined as his usual practice. In 
addition, Hughes's own testimony of his conversations with 
CSC and Algoma do not support a finding that CSC and 
Algoma would have understood that "registration" involved 
a legally binding promise to deal exclusively with USA, 
particularly because Hughes acknowledged that, although 
he "believed it was understood," he never even used the 
term "exclusive" in those discussions. App. at 209. 
 
Drawing guidance from our decision in Channel Home 
Centers, we conclude that this lack of specificity is fatal to 
USA's contract claims. Hughes failed to offer evidence that 
any essential term of an agreement to sell the caster was 
reached; the discussion with Tucker and the letter sent to 
him only pertain to the nine ladles, not the caster and 
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associated equipment. The fact that the ladles were 
ultimately sold along with the caster and its associated 
equipment does not suggest an agreement of the size and 
scope contended for by USA. And lacking terms for price, 
delivery, or date, or any other indication that the parties 
had manifested a mutual intent to bind themselves to a 
contract of sale, it cannot be said that this agreement was 
one for the sale of the caster, or even of the ladles. 
 
In sum, we find insufficient evidence in this case of an 
enforceable agreement either to negotiate in good faith 
toward the consummation of a sale transaction or to pay 
Hughes a finder's fee if and when the sale was made. 
 
B. 
 
Arguably, USA's unjust enrichment (quantum meruit) 
claim in Count 5 is stronger than its contract claim, as a 
jury might not have been persuaded by the defendants' 
argument that USA provided no benefit to the parties in 
connection with the ultimate sale of the caster from Algoma 
to CSC. We need not decide that issue because USA's 
unjust enrichment claims (as well as its contract claims) 
cannot succeed because of its failure of proof with respect 
to damages. The District Court stated that damages was 
"the most striking problem" with USA's case. App. at 274. 
We agree. 
 
To prove damages, USA would have been required to give 
the factfinder evidence upon which it could base a 
calculation of damages to a "reasonable certainty." ATACS 
Corp., 155 F.2d. at 668. "Reasonable certainty" as we have 
stated, "embraces a rough calculation that is not too 
speculative, vague or contingent upon some unknown 
factor." Id. at 669 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
USA's evidence does not supply a basis for a calculation 
of damages that would be anything other than speculative, 
vague, or contingent within the contemplation of our 
ATACS opinion. In the first place, there is no evidence from 
which one might be able to quantify the benefit that USA 
claims to have bestowed upon the parties. Hughes testified 
that his transactions generally were structured such that 
either he negotiated a finder's fee or he would retain as 
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profit the spread between the price the seller was willing to 
take from USA and the price that the buyer was willing to 
pay USA. 
 
As noted above, there was no evidence that a finder's fee 
was negotiated with either of the parties. Nor did USA 
present evidence from which a jury could find a custom in 
the industry with respect to appropriate finder's fees. 
Without evidence that would support a calculation of an 
appropriate finder's fee, or an estimate of Hughes's services 
on an hourly basis, a factfinder would be forced to engage 
in bald conjecture as to the value of USA's services. 
 
Nor could a factfinder determine damages on the basis of 
a "spread" between the lower limit of what Algoma would 
have accepted for the caster and the upper limit which CSC 
would have paid. Because USA, by its own admissions, had 
not arrived at even an approximation of the price at which 
Algoma was willing to sell and the price at which CSC was 
willing to buy, see App. at 268-69, there is no way for a 
factfinder to determine what, if any, "spread" would result 
from the transactions. 
 
USA contends that it endeavored to introduce such 
evidence but was prevented from doing so by the District 
Court, an issue we review for abuse of discretion. We find 
USA's contention has no merit. The evidence it sought to 
introduce was merely Hughes's own testimony regarding 
how much he anticipated making from the transaction. See 
App. at 197, 203, 204, 206. The District Court rebuffed 
these efforts on the ground that the witness's subjective 
anticipation was irrelevant. We find no abuse of discretion 
in these rulings. 
 
USA further urges that the District Court erred in 
refusing to allow Hughes to testify as to what he made in 
other, unrelated transactions. The District Court sustained 
objections to this line of questioning as well, stating: 
 
       There has to be some basis for determining one's 
       losses. Either they have to be by agreement or there 
       has to be some standard in the industry. It isn't what 
       he considered to be the basis . . . . I think it is clear 
       that they didn't have an agreement. But it just can't be 
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       that he picked out some basis and based his opinion 
       on it. 
 
App. at 198. Insofar as USA's counsel did not lay a 
foundation adequate to support the fungibility of 
transactions, we find no abuse of the court's discretion in 
its unwillingness to admit evidence regarding unrelated 
transactions. We note in this regard that Hughes had 
earlier testified, on direct, as follows regarding transactions 
in his business: 
 
       Q. . . . . Is every deal in your business the same ? 
 
       A. No, every deal is different, different structure, 
       depending on the customer and the seller. It can be 
       structured in a multitude of ways. 
 
App. at 99. Hence, we agree with the District Court that 
USA's proffer of evidence regarding other transactions was 
insufficiently probative of damages. 
 
Finally, USA urges that it presented evidence of an 
industry standard sufficient to create a jury issue on 
damages. We disagree. After the District Court had 
informed counsel for plaintiff that Hughes would not be 
allowed to testify as to his anticipated fee for the 
transaction in the absence of any foundation to support it, 
and that evidence of an industry standard would be 
appropriate, the following colloquy with Hughes occurred: 
 
       Q. Are there industry standards in the used steel mill 
       industry that pertain to norms on transactions on a 
       percentage basis? 
 
       A. Could you be more specific? I am not sure wha t 
       kind of sale you are referring to. 
 
       Q. In connection with the sale of a piece of used steel 
       mill equipment, are there industry norms or standards 
       that you are personally familiar with from your 
       experience in the industry as to appropriate percentage 
       fee figures as a fee for your services? 
 
       A. The standard that I'm familiar with is the bott om 
       line. 
 
       Q. What is that bottom line figure? 
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       A. 20 percent. 
 
       Q. Is that the figure you have utilized in the c ourse of 
       your experience over the past 20 years? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
App. at 201. 
 
The import of this testimony was clarified on cross- 
examination, when, after Hughes reiterated that"we keep a 
bottom line of 20 percent," the court began questioning 
Hughes as to what he meant: 
 
       THE COURT: What does it mean, you keep a bottom 
       line? Does that mean in every transaction you make at 
       least 20 percent? 
 
       THE WITNESS: We start out. 
 
       THE COURT: What does "start out" mean? Do you 
       make at least 20 percent on every transaction you do? 
 
       THE WITNESS: We start out with a bottom line of 20 
       percent. After negotiation, it's possible to go below that. 
       But we start with a bottom line of saying, before we 
       quote a price . . . we say, look, this has got to be 20 
       percent above the asking price of the seller. Then we 
       quote the price. Now it might be 40 percent to start 
       with, but the bottom line is 20 percent because if you 
       can't do it for 10, you lose money. 
 
App. at 235. At this point, counsel for Algoma then 
resumed questioning. After establishing that USA has made 
less than ten percent in earlier transactions, counsel asked 
the following: 
 
       Q. So your 20 percent is an internal starting point? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. It's an internal as opposed to some kind of industry 
       standard; it's an internal USA starting point? 
 
       A. It's an industry standard because I have talked to all 
       my counterparts and competitors and that's how they 
       view their deals. 
 
       Q. That starting point has nothing to do with where 
       ultimately brokers end up in terms of the 
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       compensation they receive, correct? It could be higher, 
       it could be lower, it's across the board? 
 
       A. Yes, uh-huh. 
 
       . . . 
 
       Q. . . . . Do you agree that there is no industry 
       standard in determining how much compensation USA 
       receives? 
 
       A. Well, if you're asking me, is there a set percentage 
       that I make on every deal, the answer is no. There is 
       no set percentage. 
 
       . . . 
 
       Q. I am asking, Mr. Hughes, for an industry standard 
       with respect to the amount of compensation USA 
       ultimately receives on any given deal. There is no 
       industry standard is there? 
 
       A. No, I would say every deal is different. I have said 
       that in the past. Every deal is different. 
 
App. at 236-37. 
 
In light of this testimony, we conclude that the District 
Court did not err in holding that there was no evidence 
upon which a jury could base a finding of damages with the 
"reasonable certainty" required by our decision in ATACS. 
Contrary to USA's protestation that there is an industry 
standard of 20 percent (presumably of the purchase price), 
its only witness acknowledged that this figure is simply the 
starting point for negotiations--the goal that USA seeks to 
accomplish with each deal. The testimony would not 
support a finding that the industry at large recognizes that 
20 percent of the sale price is an appropriate commission 
in the absence of an agreement. 
 
We therefore agree with the District Court that there was 
a failure of proof on damages. In light of this conclusion, 
there is no need to decide whether, if evidence of damages 
were not lacking, USA satisfied its burden of production 
with respect to liability for unjust enrichment. 
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IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed. 
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